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Abstract 
Transition of energy systems has been under-theorised. We have argued previously that energy efficiency as a 
strategy for fossil fuel replacement is inadequate as energy demand is not being reduced by efficiency alone. This 
paper is intended to elaborate further on the reasons. We require better answers to better questions about the nature of 
energy regimes and how they resist change. Our present-day socio-technical energy regime is a global integrated 
technical arrangement based on cheap high-yield energy sources (fossil fuels) with built-in ‘progressive’ social and 
economic directions. This ‘progressive’ change relies on cheap energy as a resource towards ever greater global 
integration and economic efficiency. Energy regime change will be not a tinkering at the edges but will require a 
dismantling of this ‘progressive’ tendency with radical retrogressive economic and social consequences. We conclude 
a change of our relationship with energy will require the reversal of a contingent ‘progressive’ tendency that is as old 
as mankind and the necessarily modest building of a new infrastructural apparatus designed to a new ‘end’, or the 
reversion to previous low or lower demand apparatus based on non-fossil energy sources. Both solutions would imply 
major social and economic changes which we will deal with in another paper.  
 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.  
Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of CUE 
 
 
Keywords: energy transition, urban energy system, socio-technical systems, systemic lock-in. 
1. Introduction 
 
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +31 (0)15 27 84272; fax: +31 (0)15 27 83694 
E-mail address: s.a.read@tudelft.nl. 
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
 016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of the organizing committee of CUE 2015
10   Stephen Read and Erik Lindhult /  Energy Procedia  88 ( 2016 )  9 – 15 
Today we face the need to transform our energy systems. We need to reduce our dependence on energy 
sourced from cheap fossil fuels and replace fossil fuels with sustainable energy sources. The problem is 
that the <energy efficiency + replacement of fossil fuels = sustainability> equation [1] is accepted but the 
hoped for reduction in the demand for fossil fuels is not materialising in an adequate timeframe. In 
addition, while there is significant public concern, the action regarding curtailing fossil fuel use and the 
release of carbon emissions into the atmosphere is not demonstrated. The priority of both politicians and 
electorates is consistently for economic growth. In the recent past governments and industry have reduced 
efforts and incentives for renewable sources [2] while fossil fuel use is projected to rise further at least 
until 2040 [3] by which time we should be well over the 2C climate change ‘limit’ [4]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Energy demand rise since 1850. The plausibility of the timely closing of the ‘replacement gap’ is questioned. 
Oil price rises should have worked for the advancement of alternative energy sources, but overcapacity 
and new sources have ‘solved’ the economics of fossil fuel supply and stagnating demand is regarded as 
an economic problem rather than as a replacement opportunity. Advocates for climate change action 
blame the power of special interests (fossil-fuel suppliers) and the inadequacies of political control and 
leadership [5].  
It seems there should be no argument regarding the necessity of climate change action while progress 
is slow and even negative and questions have been raised about the political will to stem the use of fossils 
fuels and avert climate change. We intend here neither to assume that will is all that is needed nor to 
minimise the difficulties of change. Our response is to explore further what a transition from fossil-fuelled 
high-energy systems to sustainable renewable-energy systems entails and to clarify the social-systemic 
constraints and systemic ‘necessities’ bound up with the political questions, to shed light on the dilemma.  
There are different questions implied here. One is about whether and why fossil fuel use and economic 
performance and growth are linked. US President Obama reflects the scientific orthodoxy when he thinks 
not and uses the success of ‘green industry’ as a rationale [5]. We believe this to be a confusion of ‘levels’ 
as green industry is itself energy-wise ‘subsidised’ by and is economically a small dependent component 
of a much larger fossil-fuel dependent system [6] that at the same time depends on (and collapses without) 
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economic profit. Are our societies and economies dependent on the conversion of cheap energy sources 
into high-yield energy – or on current levels of energy demand (levels that can only practicably be 
supported by fossil fuels)? We want to ask this question in a following paper. 
Here we ask what energy demand represents in an advanced industrial society. What difficulties and 
costs are entailed in what we have to transition to? Do we know and can we act on the gap between the 
high-energy society we are expected to transition from and the much lower-energy society we expect to 
transition to? Is that gap bridgeable within the envelope of societal expectations of prosperity and 
economic growth? We have been made aware of the scope of the problem of climate change; could our 
difficulties be related to the scope of the solution of societal and economic change?  
2. Technology and infrastructure 
There are number of starting points that need to be made. The first is that technology is not an 
‘externality’ when it comes to thinking about species and society. The social is sometimes understood as 
separate to, and to add (irrational) complexity to formalisable functional problems, but the human world is 
tightly organised as internally consistent ‘socio-technical regimes’. Technology “is an ongoing and 
unfinished process through which people, society” and things “weave … the meaningful conditions of 
everyday life” [7]. Some [8, 9, 10, 11, 12] have asked what technology is in its essence. Their answers 
have pointed to mankind’s own nature as fabricators of our world. Technology exists not apart from but as 
an integrative factor of society. It mediates every perception and every action; in its larger scales it creates 
an immersive environment in which we know and do in ways technology makes possible and natural.  
People live in material-technical cultures. It is in the nature of technology to be highly aligned with and 
adjusted to the users of technology. Behaviour is mediated through material and technology so that people 
are enabled and purpose is embedded in these alignments and working within them becomes normal and 
self-evident.  
But technologies are not just adjusted to us, they are also adjusted to other technologies. The tools and 
objects we encounter and use are organised in integrated and coherent socio-technical worlds. Technology 
is about the ways these worlds are made and maintained once made. Technology’s essence is its 
integration as socio-technical and material-cultural infrastructures. These are immersive environments in 
which interdependencies of ends and means are established as practice [13, 14, 15]. 
This extends through all practical and institutional aspects of societies and economies so that it can be 
hard for people to even imagine alternatives. The result is that transition in any direction may be difficult 
because we are dealing with not just human behaviour and habit but also the practical, material and 
environmental conditions of their behaviour and habit. ‘Regimes’ themselves consist of organised bundles 
of interdependent practices, institutions and technologies integrating agricultural, industrial, commercial, 
administrative, military and exchange aspects and incorporating urban places and networks. They include 
technologies and our cities, constructed historically to maintain ‘advanced’ societies and economies. They 
consume and have consumed vast resources to do this 
3. Regime change and ‘progress’ 
There have been successive distinct energy regimes and demographic states, beginning with hunter-
gathering, passing through agricultural and urban, then industrial regimes to the condition we live in today 
[16]. Pre-historians date the beginning of cultural, as opposed to biological evolution, to about 25 000 
years ago [17]. Since that time humans have evolved in combination with their tools. The first major step 
up the evolutionary ladder involved a 25-fold population increase in an energy transition from hunter-
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gathering to agriculture and the foundation of cities. Cultivation provided the impulse for an economy 
based in agricultural productivity, the surplus of which subsidised urbanisation and social specialisation.  
Stepping forward to 1800, roughly 97% of people still lived in rural areas, still subsidising the lives of 
those who lived in cities. The next two hundred years saw urbanisation accelerate (and the population 
increase seven times) as energy stored in fossil fuels was exploited to mechanise societies and economies. 
Infrastructure projects were part of the ‘reconstruction’ and ‘rescaling’ of city and nation state, Human 
population grew at 1,5% per year and energy consumption grew at 3% per year, indexing the economic 
expansion [18]. Fossils accounted through this period however for only a slowly increasing fraction of the 
energy produced.  
The last (post second world war) phase was the true fossil age (see figure 1), when oil (transportation) 
and coal (electricity) drove massive urban development and global production of consumer goods. A 
geopolitics of oil led in the 1970s to a globalisation of production processes and the invention of a new 
economy of neoliberalism [19]. The ‘flows’ of materials and products at a global level fed into new 
metropolitan landscapes of mobility [20] where lifestyle comforts like heated houses and showers 
completed the picture. Large infrastructure projects were again part of this, transforming the land and 
housing market in the developed world for a neoliberal economy and suburban car-oriented ways of life.  
Infrastructures facilitated new levels of social and urban differentiation but also enabled an intensified 
exploitation of natural resources at previously unheard of scales [21]. 
4. Transition and ‘progress’ 
Economists believe that increasing energy consumption is a consequence of economic growth. History 
tells us however that economies (and populations) grow when energy consumption expands [22]. The 
regimes and systems that characterise societies mark a ‘progressive’ material-cultural evolution given 
teleological direction and driven forward by regime changes of simultaneous population growth and 
growth in per capita energy demand. This ‘progress’ depended also on transitions from solar to organised 
solar (agriculture) to stored solar (fossil fuels) energy sources and the substantial energy yield increases 
from the one to the next.  
Once a transition to a new energy regime and its associated society and economy occurred the step 
backwards seemed to be foreclosed, blocked by the dependency of the increased population on the new 
energy system, while at the same time they were locked in by their material-cultural system and the 
infrastructural apparatus they had invested in.  
What this ‘progress’ also suggests is that there will need to be a societal and economic ‘retrogression’ 
involved in a massive curtailing of energy demand. Transition in any direction may be difficult, transition 
backwards impossible without severe consequences for capacity to support a society and life we consider 
normal today.  
While there is no necessary or ideal ‘end’ to which processes of development are directed [23], there 
are here very real contingent ‘ends’ tied up with the exact qualities of the energy sources concerned.  
The differentiation of territories into urban and rural at the emergence of cities also marked out a 
directionality and of urbanisation which has drawn rural migrants to cities ever since. It is also the reversal 
of this aspirational ‘direction’ of power we are asked to consider when thinking about reversing the 
‘progress’ of urban societies. 
5. Retrogressing to the future 
The material-cultural worlds in which people are enabled and purpose is embedded make these things 
normal and self-evident and alternatives, especially ‘retrogressive’ alternatives difficult to implement or 
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even contemplate. Energy consuming infrastructures embody affordances, channel energy and resource 
flows, and causality becomes circular. They make actions cheap, convenient and easy while at the same 
time they are expensive to construct. They are also difficult to deconstruct in that the capacities they 
engender have become ‘normal’ social expectation. 
What are the prospects for transition? We will sketch one possible outcome. There are others but space 
does not allow their inclusion here. Resource and commodity flows and chains are optimised at global 
scales. The resulting economies of scale have for the most part been achieved and further expansion is up 
against planetary limits. The globalisers face diminishing profits [24]. The economy must grow, but will 
grow only where material resources are consumed at high levels and where urban development continues 
and delivers the highest intensity of energy demand. And this while these conditions are increasingly 
difficult to sustain. What will emerge is a crisis of economic stagnation characterised by overcapacity and 
lack of demand [22] and the discontinuous breakdown of global supply chains. This will stimulate local 
supply chains as alternatives in food and other essentials as well as a need to learn to survive without 
economic growth and its increasingly unprofitable technologies (like global shipping). 
Some of the possibilities for the future are given to us in history. 1940s levels of energy demand were 
one fifth of what they are today and within shooting distance of renewable energy. But renewables will 
turn out to be less renewable than we think they are when the energy costs (fossils today) of energy 
production are accounted for. 
The conclusion has to be that the present economy, already stagnating, will be no longer viable on 
these terms. The transition will not involve an economic dip before innovation and business as usual 
because the innovation will not be able to scale up to present levels. Efforts at local import replacement 
and ‘circular’ and ‘resource economies’ will in the intermediate phase add resilience as global supply 
chains come under increasing threat of catastrophic failure. We will most likely see a collapse of the 
economy (ideally long before an ultimate collapse of the environment) and a new beginning built mainly 
on small-scale changes in supply of food and other necessities. In spite of a massive drop in living 
standards, these beginnings may well show a way towards a lower energy but also lower affordance 
future.  
Some claim the future involves geotechnical apparatus organised to a radically different ‘end’ – not to 
that of handiness and usefulness of tools for action but constructed to produce and maintain a biosphere in 
a form not fatal to human habitation. The end of these ‘infrasystems’ would be to ameliorate the 
consequences of the channelling of resources and energies for our convenience [25]. But reorientation to a 
purpose outside of direct practice and its ‘practice environment’ will be very difficult or impossible. It is 
more likely we will have to cultivate to sustain rather than produce another machine.  
Building complex new geotechnical solutions are very likely beyond our resource capacities anyway. 
Just finishing the one we started in order to deal with global social inequality is probably already beyond 
our resource capacity. 
6. Conclusion 
How difficult is it to change systemic direction and purpose? Jonsson has argued that transition will be 
from infrastructural systems that are basically humanly and economically oriented to ones that support 
ecological ‘purpose’. History shows this is more difficult than it seems and we have begun to highlight 
some of the reasons. 
At one level the issue is simple. Ours is a high-energy society. We are tied to high energy use by 
societal, economic and cultural demands. These demands are delivered today by high-energy socio-
technical regimes. Climate change and proposed measures to alleviate it are an interruption to this basic 
character of our energy regime. In economist-speak they are an ‘externality’ to the ‘systems’ and 
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‘regimes’ we have ourselves created. They may always be and we will be obliged for the sake of our own 
survival to place a limit on global energy demand at the level of about one fifth what it is today. We will 
have to manage economy and population in the future to this limit and learn to live with the economic, 
demographic and social structure and lifestyle consequences. 
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